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Abstract 
This paper explores monetary policy decision-making within an insurance model with expected utility-maximizing 
policy-makers. The authors consider that policy-makers are different in terms of their backgrounds, experience and 
skills and they may disagree on the appropriate policy response. In a monetary policy committee, they share informa-
tion and decide on interest rates by means of an agreed voting rule. The authors show that, in the presence of risk and 
search costs, it would be optimal for policy-makers to fully insure against the expected loss from a potential policy 
error. Whether a monetary policy committee sufficiently hedges against this risk will depend on several factors such as 
the skills of policy-makers, the distribution of members’ beliefs, and the committee’s (statutory) voting rule, but also 
on other factors not captured by the model. 
Keywords: monetary policy committee, analysis of collective decision-making, search costs, voting behavior. 
JEL Classification: D72, D81, D83, and E58. 
 
Introduction 
Monetary policy-makers face various types of un-
certainty. These uncertainties are exacerbated dur-
ing episodes of a financial crisis. Policy-makers 
face multiple types of uncertainty about the current 
and future state of the economy, the structure of the 
economy, and the strategic interactions between eco-
nomic agents. The literature suggests that in the pres-
ence of multiple uncertainties, making committees in 
charge of monetary policy decisions is beneficial (see 
e.g. Blinder, 2004). Importantly, the advantage of a 
monetary policy committee is that its policy-makers 
may benefit from a fruitful group interaction, which 
will force the committee to consider a wider and 
broader range of possible future outcomes. 
The real-time assessment of the monetary policy 
stance and the monetary policy response to shocks 
hitting the economy is affected by multiple sources of 
uncertainty, which cannot be all captured in a single 
model. First, policy-makers face uncertainty about the 
state of the economy which concerns various forms of 
data and model uncertainty. Second, there could be 
also uncertainty about how the economy may be 
working, and evolving over time (uncertainty about 
the structure of the economy). Another source of un-
certainty is behavioral and concerns the dynamic inte-
raction between a central bank and private agents and 
possibly other policy-makers. This point got special 
prominence during the financial crisis. When structu- 
ral relationships change, the uncertainty about the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism may be 
higher. Though, when taking monetary policy deci-
sions, policy-makers follow their beliefs about the 
                                                     
 Alexander Jung, Francesco Paolo Mongelli, 2016. 
Alexander Jung, Senior Economist at the European Central Bank, Germany. 
Francesco Paolo Mongelli, Senior Advisor at the European Central Bank, 
Honorary Professor at the Frankfurt Goethe University, Germany. 
The views expressed in this paper are our own and do not reflect those of the 
Eurosystem. We remain responsible for any errors or omissioms. 
working of the economy and these beliefs are normal-
ly based on validity of existing relationships. Hence, 
in times of changing relationships (like during a finan-
cial crisis), there is the risk that policy-makers recog-
nize these changes at a rather late stage. Moreover, the 
Condorcet jury theorem suggests that larger commit-
tees do a better job in making decitions under uncer-
tainly than smaller committees (see Austen–Smith and 
Banks, 1996). The sources of uncertainty may be the 
same regardless of the size of a monetary policy 
committee but they may be specific to the monetary 
policy regime that is chosen as well as to other factors. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze whether monetary 
policy-makers can hedge themselves against the risk 
of policy error in the presence of Knightian uncertain-
ty. We show that, in the presence of search costs, it 
would be optimal for policy-makers to fully insure 
against the expected loss from a potential policy error. 
But, heterogeneous beliefs about the future state of the 
economy and voting rules may lead to suboptimal 
hedging strategies with higher risk of policy errors. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 recalls 
some shortcomings of the traditional risk-management 
approach to monetary policy. Section 2 presents a 
stylized model and analyses to what extent the pres-
ence of search costs influence the outcome of the deci-
sion-making process under uncertainty. Section 3 
illustrates the potential impact of alternative (statutory) 
voting rules on the hedging behavior of a monetary 
policy committee under uncertainty. Final Section 
concludes. 
1. Limitations of the risk-management approach 
In Brainard’s (1967) model, policy-makers should aim 
for attenuation and gradualism in the conduct of policy 
under uncertainty. He proposed an analogy between a 
monetary policy-maker and a risk manager. Monetary 
policy decision-making can be characterized as an 
ongoing cost-benefit analysis to cope with risk and 
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uncertainty. Former Fed chairman Greenspan (2004) 
subscribed to this notion of policy-making and 
stressed that monetary policy involves: “understand-
ing as much as possible the many sources of risk and 
uncertainties that policymakers face, quantifying 
those risks when possible, and assessing the costs 
associated with each of the risks”. 
Today, the monetary policy process of most central 
banks in developed countries is guided by a risk 
management approach (RMA) to monetary policy-
making. This can be illustrated for example by the 
increasing popularity of strategies focussing on the 
“risks to price stability” (e.g. various variants of the 
inflation targeting strategy). Because monetary po- 
licy works with a lag and monetary policy decisions 
are taken in real time, the precise stance of the real 
economy is not fully known at the time of the policy 
meeting. In the RMA, the ability of policy-makers 
to cope with data and model uncertainty and to 
identify the best possible policy response important-
ly depends on the quality of forecasting and of sce-
nario analysis. This is because cost-benefit analyses 
of policy alternatives are based on forecasts that are 
generated by econometric models run by experts.1. 
The risk management approach is very intuitive, 
though it has some limitations in theory and prac-
tice: First, the approach does not explicitly model 
the costs of information search. Second, policy-
makers may be more averse to deflationary than to 
inflationary shocks so that the underlying loss func-
tion may not be symmetric (see Kilian and Manga-
nelli, 2008). Third, as documented by various au-
thors (e.g., Kenny and Morgan, 2011), in specific 
episodes of a financial crisis the predictive failure of 
macroeconomic tools and expert judgement widely 
shared by institutional and private forecasters alike 
is present. Fourth, as suggested by Taleb (2007), 
decision-makers are mainly concerned about the 
costs of possible policy mistakes. They worry less 
about statistical distributions of risks in their as-
sessments, i.e. they tend to ignore those risks that 
have a small probability and cannot be quantified 
with any confidence (tail risks). An important rea-
son for this behavior is that the monetary policy 
decision-making process entails substantial costs. 
Hence, policy-makers have an incentive to econo-
mise on their efforts and to focus on a limited num-
ber of measurable risks. Fifth, the higher the degree 
of uncertainty surrounding “model-based analysis”, 
the more policy-makers may deviate from the risk-
management approach and instead rely on their 
heuristics (i.e., their whole body of knowledge, 
experience and beliefs) and apply judgement. It will 
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lead to a greater dispersion of probabilities assigned 
by policy-makers to the risks of certain events even 
though they share all available information among 
them. From central bankers’ communications it is 
evident that during crisis events policy-makers tend 
to base their monetary policy decisions more on 
their individual judgement and heuristics than ot- 
herwise2. 
2. A model of decision-making with search costs 
In this section we introduce a stylized model of the 
monetary policy decision-making process that takes 
into account search costs. We assume that policy-
makers pursue only one domestic policy objective 
(i.e. a price stability objective). The actors of the 
model are expected utility-maximizing policy-
makers, but their skills may vary (see Berk and 
Bierut, 2009). 
2.1. The role of search costs. Policy-makers take 
decisions using available information and exercis-
ing judgement. There is uncertainty about the future 
state of the economy, and thus alternative outcomes 
are conceivable. Before deciding on interest rates, 
policy-makers are expected to prepare for the policy 
meetings and to share information with their peers. 
They face search costs when gathering information 
on the current and future state of the economy. This 
aspect is neglected in most models on monetary 
policy decision-making. In the presence of such 
costs, policymakers have to decide how much effort 
their staff should make to provide them with rele-
vant information. Gathering of relevant information 
can help to improve the quality of the policy deci-
sion given uncertainty. For instance, such efforts 
may reduce (forecast) uncertainty and thereby con-
tribute to increasing the robustness of the decision. 
In this sense, policy-makers can, by expanding their 
information gathering activities, hedge against the 
risk of policy error. The negative impact of a policy 
error may still materialize, but the resulting conse-
quences can be mitigated by appropriate monetary 
policy decisions. 
In order to examine what policy-makers should do 
in the presence of increased uncertainties, we refer 
to a variant of the (optimal) insurance model pro-
posed by Arnott and Stiglitz (1988). We assume 
that policy-makers can be modelled as expected 
utility-maximizing agents. There is uncertainty 
about the future state of the economy and policy-
makers take their decisions as risk-managers who 
have certain ideas of how likely it is that a policy 
error happens given available information. An ana- 
logy to the insurance model can be drawn with 
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some modifications. Policy-makers are especially 
concerned about the possibility of policy error, 
which could have adverse consequences for the 
fulfilment of the central bank’s objective. With 
some probability such policy error will happen, but 
this probability is not known to policy-makers in 
real-time (or ex ante). The question is: what would 
expected utility-maximizing policy-makers do to 
cope with this situation? In the analysis of monetary 
policy decision-making information search can be 
thought to be a production technology that helps to 
hedge against the risk of policy errors in the follow-
ing sense. Collecting, interpreting, and sharing of 
relevant information can improve the robustness of 
monetary policy decisions. At the same time infor-
mation gathering entails costs which are usually 
neglected when analyzing the decision-making 
process. Information search allows policy-makers to 
hedge against the risk of policy error under incom-
plete information, since more (and better) informa-
tion brings them closer to full information. It thus 
increases the likelihood for policymakers to make 
the right choice. 
In the presence of search costs, policy-makers will 
economize on their efforts, and also exert judge-
ment. Hence, they have an incentive to use an in-
formation set that is less comprehensive than full 
information. In this paper, we assume that informa-
tion gathering activities by policy-makers can be 
described by a technology which follows Gossen’s 
first law of diminishing marginal returns. Consistent 
with the notion of informationally efficient markets 
(see Fama, 1970), policy-makers can increase their 
overall utility from information search until they 
have reached full information, but not beyond that 
point.3 In the next subsection, we derive the optimal 
hedging decision of expected utility-maximizing 
policy-makers in the presence of search costs. Then, 
we discuss whether under increased uncertainty 
about the probability of a policy error, committees 
with heterogeneous beliefs and individual decision-
makers react differently and whether it can be ex-
pected that they make robust decisions. 
2.2. Optimal decisions under Knightian uncer-
tainty. There are various ways to account for uncer-
tainty in monetary policy decision-making4. In line 
with the literature, we assume that two alternative, 
well-defined, future states of the economy can oc-
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cur with some probability. Yet, policy-makers are 
unable to form exact probability judgements about 
their occurrence5: 
 In the first state, an unanticipated inflationary 
(or deflationary) shock hits the economy and 
surprises policymakers. The policy error results 
in a loss in terms of expected utility. The loss 
can be mitigated though. In anticipation of the 
shock, policy-makers can increase their infor-
mation gathering efforts, thereby identifying a 
policy response that attenuates the negative 
consequences of the shock. This hedging strate-
gy against a policy error is thought to compen-
sate for the associated loss. Still some of the 
costs of the policy error may be unavoidable 
and have to be borne; and 
 In the second state of the economy, there is no 
unanticipated inflationary (or deflationary)  
shock, policymakers are well-informed and 
make the right decision. In this state, only 
search costs for information gathering will re-
duce the net payoff. 
We also assume that policy-makers are risk averse 
and that they maximize the net expected value of 
their choices given these two alternative states of 
the economy. With probability , the value of the 
outcome is x1 and with probability (1  ) the out-
come is x2:  
Max u  (x1) + (1   ) u (x2).                                 (1) 
Assume further that policy-makers have an identical 
utility function (1), and an identical search cost 
function c. For the monetary policy committee, it is 
assumed that available information is fully shared 
among the members (i.e. there is no strategic beha-
vior and members are fully cooperative). Policy-
makers receive a positive gross gain x from taking a 
decision (e.g. in terms of credibility). Gains have to 
be balanced with search costs c for information 
gathering, and with the loss d in case policy error 
happens6. 
We define a multiplier Ф > 0 as a measure of the 
effectiveness of policy-makers’ information gather-
ing efforts. It expresses the overall returns from 
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information gathering as a multiple of search costs. 
Information search is thought to provide policy-
makers with a (positive) payoff Фc, which may 
partly or fully offset the loss in case a policy error 
occurs7. 
The ratio dФ can be interpreted as hedging ratio. 
Policy-makers are assumed to maximize the net 
expected value from the two alternative outcomes 
such as (see Varian, 1992): 
max u  (x  d  c + Фc) + (1  ) u (x  c),      (2) 
where 0 <  < 1 is the probability that a policy 
error happens. This probability of the unanticipated 
shock for the economy is exogenous to the model. 
In the beginning of the period a decision has to be 
taken, and at the end of the period nature reveals the 
state of the world. Policy-makers cannot influence 
the probability distribution of the shocks, but by 
their decision they can only attenuate the response 
to the unanticipated inflationary shock (i.e. in part 
offset the loss). Moreover, we exclude the extreme 
cases where  is zero or unity, because both would 
imply that policy-makers know with certainty which 
state will materialize and they would receive the 
payoff from this state with certainty. 
Maximization of expected utility with respect to 
search costs leads to:  
( ( 1) ) 1
( ) ( 1)
.   
' *
' *
u x d + Ф c =
u x c  Ф

                        
(3) 
In order to solve the problem and to determine the 
optimal amount of information search effort c*, 
only efficient “hedging” strategies are considered. 
Policy-makers that are strictly risk averse (i.e. u’’ (x) 
< 0) are indifferent between “buying insurance” and 
“exerting judgement”, if the marginal utility from 
both states is identical. This condition is satisfied, if 
the expected payoff from additional insurance is 
zero: 
(1 ) 1
( 1)
.  Ф

                                                     (4) 
Under this condition, it is not possible for a policy-
maker to increase his/her (net) utility from informa-
tion search. Taking (3) and (4) together, it can be 
shown that an efficient “hedging” strategy (Фmax) is 
just a function of the (exogenous) probability 8: 
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results here. 
8 Note that the probability of a state to materialise is exogenous, so that 
the policy-maker can only influence the consequences of the unantici-
pated shock for the economy, but not the likelihood of its occurrence. 
1maxФ                                                                    (5) 
Given that the probability of a policy error is in the 
range of] 0; 1 [, Фmax is always greater than unity. It 
will be higher (lower), the smaller (bigger) is the 
probability of a policy error. With Фmax > 1, policy-
makers always obtain net benefits from their in-
vestment in information search. Hence, the condi-
tion for the optimal investment in information 
search under an efficient hedging strategy under (3) 
and (5) is given by: 
*
max
dc = d.Ф                                                        (6) 
Hence, the model illustrates (see equation 6) that 
expected utility maximizing policymakers have an 
incentive to fully insure against the expected loss 
from a potential policy error. For strictly risk-averse 
policy-makers it would be rationale to formulate a 
policy response by which the expected negative 
consequences of the unanticipated shock can be 
fully offset. The greater the probability of a policy 
error, the more insurance policy-makers should buy. 
2.3. Heterogeneous skills of policy-makers. Hete-
rogeneous information processing skills may influ-
ence policy-makers’ hedging decision. The optimal 
hedging decision (see equation 6) also depends on 
the skills of policymakers in information 
processing, as measured by the value of Φ. Hence, 
for a given probability, policy-makers with a higher 
(lower) ratio of effectiveness in information 
processing (where ΦH > Φ > ΦL) would need a 
lower (higher) investment in information search in 
order to hedge against the risk of policy error. 
Figure 1 illustrates policy-makers’ payoff from 
information search which increases with the amount 
of investment in information search. If the probabil-
ity of a policy error was known with certainty, it 
would be optimal for a policy-maker or committee 
to invest the amount of search costs c*, which 
would yield a corresponding payoff αdΦ. For a 
given probability α and a known loss d, the payoff 
from hedging depends only on the multiplier Φ. 
Assume for the purpose of illustration, the informa-
tion processing skills of a representative policy-
maker are given by Φ. Moreover, the single policy-
maker and the policy committee would invest the 
optimal amount of search costs c*. If the policy 
committee has a lower ratio of effectiveness (ΦL < 
Φ) than the single policy-maker, the resulting 
payoff from hedging (αdΦL) would be smaller. 
Hence, compared to the single policy-maker the 
committees’ hedging gain would be smaller. While 
they would invest much more in information search 
(as compared to the single policy-maker), they 
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would buy sufficient insurance against the risk of 
policy error, but face higher costs. If, however, the 
policy committee has a higher ratio of effectiveness 
(ΦH > Φ) than the single policy-maker, the resulting 
payoff from hedging (αHdΦ) would exceed that of a 
single policy-maker. In sum, efficient policy com-
mittees can be expected to make robust policy deci-
sions, but may face higher search costs than an in-
dividual policy-maker. At the same time, less effi-
cient policy committees may expose themselves to a 
greater risk of policy error. The above analysis im-
plies that the widespread notion according to which 
policy committees are generally superior to single 
policy-makers may not always hold. For instance, 
if, in the presence of uncertainty, the discussions in 
a policy committee are characterized by a low de-
gree of effectiveness in information gathering, the 
single policy-maker will have it easier to make 
more robust monetary policy decisions than the 
committee. 
 
Fig. 3. Information search and gains from hedging 
 
3. Voting rules and heterogeneous beliefs 
In a monetary policy committee, agreement is sought 
by means of a (statutory) voting rule9. It must be res-
pected by all members of the committee. The voting 
rule is an important tool for group decision-making. In 
the presence of disperse preferences and views across 
members, it would be otherwise very difficult and 
time consuming to agree on a policy option. The vot-
ing rule is therefore also a way of dealing with uncer-
tainties in monetary policy committees. 
In order to examine what would be the influence of 
alternative voting rules on the outcome of group deci-
sion-making, we refer to our insurance model and 
assume that risk-averse policymakers try to form a 
common belief on the (unknown) probability α instead 
of voting on the interest rate, as in conventional mod-
els. In a monetary policy committee, there could be a 
continuum of diverse views on the true value of α. We 
illustrate under what conditions the hedging behavior 
of policy-makers may be sensitive to the voting rule. 
In order to address the question, we compare the out-
come of a committee decision under a specific voting 
rule with a policy committee that averages votes (i.e., 
a representative policy-maker)10. 
                                                     
9 The choice of a voting rule is part of the institutional setup of a com-
mittee. The voting rule is normally binding for a series of committee 
meetings. Therefore, it is often laid down in the statutes or rules of 
procedures of a central bank. 
10 In the literature, averaging is often discussed as a conceivable option 
for monetary policy committees, albeit less relevant in practice. Ger-
lach-Kristen (2004) shows that this rule may be relevant for our com-
A voting rule has two main objectives. First, it pro-
vides a platform for discussing the “true” preferences 
of committee members on available policy options 
and assesses the extent of mutual agreement for a 
certain policy decision. Second, a voting rule helps to 
ensure that at the end of the meeting one of the policy 
alternatives is chosen (i.e., the outcome of the 
monetary policy process becomes decisive). Var-
ious advantages and disadvantages from different 
voting rules have been widely discussed in the 
literature (for a discussion see Smidkova, 2003). 
Majority voting is wide-spread among commit-
tees, because it always provides an outcome and 
most committee members would agree to it. The 
ease of agreement on decisions by majority vo- 
ting has to be balanced with the costs in terms of 
potential policy error when a monetary policy 
decision is taken too “quickly”. Most voting rules 
have the property that an individual voter in the 
committee whose preference will determine the 
outcome of the policy decision can be identified 
(see second column of Table 1). In some in-
stances, however, the outcome of the vote is a 
priori indeterminate (e.g., unanimity voting when 
views are heterogeneous). 
                                                                                     
parisons, because, under certain conditions, averaging of policy-
makers’ votes ensures optimality. 
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Table 1. Outcome of the vote under alternative  
voting systems 
Voting rule “Decisive” voter Outcome 
Averaging Mean voter, A 
n
A j
j=1
y = y
n
1   
Majority 
voting 
Median voter, 
M 
M n+y = y ,1
2
if n is uneven 
M ny = y
2
 if n is even 
 
 Chairman, Ch yCh, if he/she has a casting vote 
Qualified 
majority 
voting 
“Quorum” 
voter, Q 
+q
Q n+y = y 1
2
 with quorum 
n -q 1
2
  if n is uneven 
+q
Q ny = y
2
 with quorum 
nq
2
  if n is even 
Unanimity Each voter, 1 … n yu=y1=... = y„ 
Notes: A: mean; Ch: chairman; M: median; Q: quorum; U: 
unanimity. 1) Note that in committees with a symmetric distribu-
tion of preferences around the mean (and in committees with only 
three members), the mean voter and the median voter would be 
identical. 
Under uncertainty, what is the impact of alternative 
voting rules on the robustness of monetary policy 
decisions by a committee? Could it change the out-
come in a way that a committee systematically neg-
lects important information that is relevant for the 
decision-making process? In other terms, could an 
individual policy-maker make more robust monetary 
policy decisions than a committee that agrees by 
means of a specific voting rule? Voting on interest 
rates in committees often works as follows: at the 
policy meeting, the chairman of the committee mod-
erates an exchange of information and views among 
members, on the basis of a pre-set agenda, so as to 
develop a consensus on the policy issue. Despite a 
diversity of views among members on which policy 
option to choose, by the end of the meeting at the la- 
test, they will have to agree on a joint decision by 
means of a vote. While during the deliberations com-
mittee members may signal their assessments on the 
policy alternatives, when it comes to voting each 
member has to provide a firm preference. In this re-
spect, an agenda by which committee members vote at 
the end of the meeting ensures that members share 
information, and that their final vote is based on all 
information available and shared at the time of a meet-
ing (see Berk and Bierut, 2005). 
Now, we make the following experiment. In the ab-
sence of knowledge of the true probability α, policy-
makers follow the principle of indifference and choose 
an initial value   = 0.5 (see Figure 2, LHS). Then, a 
shock occurs, which could have positive or negative 
consequences for the inflation outlook. Increased un-
certainty implies that policy-makers of a committee 
will have different beliefs about the likelihood of a 
policy error. Committee members are expected to 
form a common view about  . At the policy meeting, 
they may exchange their views and at the end the 
chairman holds a vote on the probability  . All 
members know that if the vote is not “decisive”, this 
will be counted as a confirmation of the initial assess-
ment (i.e.,   = 0.5). Without such a rule, the outcome 
of the vote could be indeterminate, e.g., under the 
unanimity rule when there are heterogeneous beliefs. 
As is well known from the literature on voting (see 
Tidemann, 2006), in this ballot the representative poli-
cy-maker would always choose the mean of the indi-
vidual probabilities of the committee members. The 
median would determine the outcome for a monetary 
policy committee under majority voting11. Under qual-
ified majority voting, the outcome would be similar to 
majority voting, if one group gains the quorum, but, if 
none of the two groups has enough members to gain 
the quorum, the outcome of consensus voting would 
be the status quo. Under the unanimity rule, each 
member’s vote could become “decisive” because of 
his/her veto power in case of dissent. Therefore, this 
rule has a strong tendency to confirm the initial as-
sessment. 
Figure 2 (LHS) illustrates that with a (mean)-
symmetric probability distribution of policy-makers’ 
beliefs (in our thought experiment), both a representa-
tive policy-maker and a committee under alternative 
voting rules would choose the initial value (  = 0.5). 
In this case, when a shock occurs, the committee will 
stick to its prior and the voting system will not influ-
ence the outcome. Next we turn to an asymmetric 
probability distribution (Figure 2, RHS). In the pres-
ence of the shock, several members will revise their 
                                                     
11 Note with an uneven number of members the rule is always decisive, 
but for an even number of members there may be ties. In order to avoid 
ties, most monetary policy committees either comprise of an uneven 
number of members or the chairman is given a casting vote. 
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priors towards higher values of   – the distribution is 
skewed to the right (note the case of a skew to the left 
can be analyzed in a similar manner). The representa-
tive policy-maker will again choose the mean (in our 
example  = 0.75). Given the shown distribution, the 
monetary policy committee under majority voting 
would also choose a higher value, i.e., the median  
(  = 0.78)12 By contrast, under the unanimity rule, 
the committee would confirm the prior (  = 0.5). 
Whether the committee would choose a higher value 
α under qualified majority voting depends on the 
quorum. 
What does this imply for the hedging behavior of 
policy-makers in our thought experiment? First, as 
shown in Figure 2 (RHS), under the unanimity rule 
and possibly under a qualified majority voting rule, 
the monetary policy committee would have a tenden- 
 
cy to confirm the initial value α (one may characte-
rize this as a “non-activist” approach to risk man-
agement). Because, the committee as a whole is re-
luctant to agree on the validity of a different risk 
scenario, its ability to buy sufficient insurance 
against the risk of policy error depends on whether 
the starting value for α is initially chosen high 
enough so as to encompass situations with higher 
risks. Second, the representative policy-maker and 
committees with majority voting are more likely to 
agree on a new probability α, and thereby would 
more flexibly shift between buying more and less 
insurance (one may characterize this as an “activist” 
approach to risk management). The committee’s 
ability to properly insure against the risk of policy 
error now depends on whether a majority of commit-
tee members succeeds in correctly anticipa-ting the 
direction of a future shock. 
 
Fig. 2. Policy-makers’ beliefs on the probability α 
 
Conclusions 
The classical risk management approach to monetary 
policy has known limitations. One is the neglect of 
search costs. Our model includes search costs and 
suggests that in the presence of Knightian uncertainty 
policy-makers could reduce the risk of a policy error 
by increasing their investment in information search 
even though information gathering is costly. We show 
that it would be optimal for expected utility-
maximizing policy-makers to fully insure against the 
 
expected loss from a potential policy error. These 
considerations are based on the availability of a tech-
nology that allows policy-makers to hedge against the 
risk of policy error. In our model policy-makers’ in-
formation search is a means to hedge against the nega-
tive consequences of adverse shocks. In practice sev-
eral factors prevent a monetary policy committee from 
sufficiently hedging against the risk of a policy error. 
These factors include the voting system and hetero-
geneous skills. 
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